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There is conflict among writers as to whether the weight
of American authority charges a subsequent purchaser with
record notice of encumbrances in a prior recorded deed to
other lands conveyed by a common grantor.' The question
of record notice arises, for instance, where A owning Black-
acre conveys part of it by a recorded deed to B and in the
same instrument places an encumbrance, such as an ease-
ment or restriction, on the retained portion. Later A con-
veys this remaining portion to C by a deed which makes no
mention of the encumbrance contained in the deed to B. As
a matter of policy, under the recording statutes, should C,
the subsequent purchaser, be chargeable with record notice
of the encumbrance contained in the prior recorded deed
to other lands of A? Basically, the problem appears to be
whether it would be an unreasonable burden to compel the
subsequent purchaser to read in full all conveyances made
by his prior grantors. The courts are not in accord on this
point.
Cases indicate the majority view to be that the subse-
quent purchaser is chargeable with record notice of an en-
cumbrance placed on the retained lands of the common
grantor, when such grantor encumbered the retained lands
in a prior deed to other lands. Fourteen jurisdictions so
hold with two others intimating as much,2 while only six
* Second year law student, Duke University; A.B. Duke, 1951.
It is stated in 16 A.L.R. 1013 (1922) and 5 TiFAN-Y REAL PROPERTY
§ 1266 (3rd ed. 1939), that the majority view charges a subsequent
purchaser with notice, but Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and
Therefore of Notice, 93 U. or PA. L. REV. 125 (1944) and CLARR, CovE-
NANTS AND INTEREST RUNNNG WITH THE LAND, p. 183 (2d ed. 1944) states
the majority view to the contrary.
- Hamilton v. Smith, 212 Ark. 893, 208 S.W.2d 425 (1948); Miles v.
Hollingsworth, 44 Cal.App. 539, 187 Pac. 167 (1920); American Brass
Co. v. Serra, 104 Conn. 139, 132 Atl. 565 (1926); La Cost v. Mailloux, 401
ll. 283, 81 N.E.2d 920 (1948); Harp v. Parker, 278 Ky. 78, 128 S.W.2d
211 (1939); Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 Atl. 216 (1915); Beckman
v. Schirmer, 239 Mass. 265, 132 N.E. 45 (1921); McQuade v. Wilcox. 215
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jurisdictions hold to the contrary with two indicating they
will follow the minority.3
In order that we may better appraise the individual case
holdings, let us first glance at the various reasons given in
support of the two views. There are several reasons ad-
vanced in favor of the majority rule charging the subse-
quent purchaser with record notice. (1) The recording
acts, as interpreted, hold a purchaser chargeable with notice
of anything contained in a deed of record which was exe-
cuted by a prior grantor and which concerns the land or
estate which he purchases. Under this reasoning, it is said
that the prospective purchaser has a duty to search all re-
corded conveyances of his prior grantors. (2) To hold that
there is no constructive or record notice "the restriction
might be to a considerable extent nugatory." 4 The thought
here is that the prior grantee might as well not have the
restriction if he could not enforce it once the remaining land
is conveyed by a deed which does not mention the restric-
tion. (3) The grantee in the prior deed has no way to
protect his rights other than to record his deed. (4)
It does not impose an unreasonable burden on the title
searcher for he must read the descriptions of prior con-
veyances anyway and it would take only a quick glance to
discover any restrictions since "the recitals of restrictive
covenants [usually] follow the short habendum immediately
following the description." 5
Mich. 302, 183 N.W. 771 (1921); Friederick v. Skellet Co., 180 Minn.
382, 231 N.W. 7 (1930); King v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 226 Mo. 351,
126 S.W. 415 (1910); Waldrop v. Town of Brevard, 233 N.C. 26 (1950);
Cullison v. Hotel Seaside Inc., 126 Ore. 18, 268 Pac. 758 (1928); Finley v.
Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 Atl. 299 (1931); and Latimer v. Hess, 183 S.W.2d
996 (Tex.Civ. App. 1944); with Jones v. Berg, 105 Wash. 69, 177 Pac.
712 (1919) and Boyden v. Roberts, 131 Wis. 659, 111 N.W. 701 (1907)
intimating the same.
3 Judd v. Robinson, 41 colo. 222, 92 Pac. 724 (1907); Hancock v. Gumm,
151 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921); Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N.J.L. 199,
96 Atl. 94 (1915); Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros.
Inc., 267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935); Yates v. Chandler, 162 Tenn.
388, 38 S.W.2d 70 (1931); and Providence Forge Fishing & Hunting
Club v. Gill, 117 Va. 557, 85 S.E. 464 (1915); with Clark v. Dorsett, 157
Miss. 365, 128 So. 79 (1930) and Hayslett v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 38
Ohio App. 164, 175 N.E. 888 (1930) intimating the same.
5 TiFFANY, REAT. PEoPERTY § 1266 (3rd ed. 1939).
2 WAnsH, Co3mENTAEs LAW OF REAL PRoPERaTy § 221 (1947).
DUKE BAR JOURNAL
There are likewise several reasons given to support the
minority view that a subsequent purchaser should not be
charged with such notice. (1) The history of the re-
cording acts shows that one of their purposes was to pro-
tect bona fide purchasers of land which had been previously
conveyed by an unrecorded deed and to make that deed
void as to such subsequent purchasers. (2) The recording
acts, as interpreted, apply only to subsequent purchasers of
the same land and not to subsequent purchasers of the same
grantor. (3) To charge the subsequent purchasers with
constructive notice would go against the usual rule that land
should be free of encumbrances as much as possible.
(4) To require a prospective purchaser to read fully each
deed of conveyance made by all his prior grantors would
impose too great a burden on the title searcher.
Although the courts may use any of the above reasons as
a basis for their holdings, the stated issue in most cases is
whether the prior deed is to be considered within the chain
of title of the subsequent purchaser. It should be noted that
in this problem we are dealing with record notice under
the ordinary grantor-grantee index system as disting-
uished from the tract system of recording. Of course, if
there is actual notice of the encumbrance, then record notice
is not decisive as to whether the subsequent purchaser takes
the land subject to the encumbrance.
To appreciate some of the problems involved in record
notice from a transaction of this type, it seems desirable to
mention the various encumbrances which are often imposed
on the common grantor's retained lands and under what cir-
cumstances these encumbrances are created. The encum-
brance may take the form of an easement, a restrictive cove-
nant, or a recital of a contract to sell or otherwise affect the
remaining lands. They may appear, for example, under
circumstances where there are only two adjoining lots or
parcels, where a part is being conveyed out of a larger tract,
or where a large tract is being subdivided either with or
without a recorded plat following a general scheme.
In several cases under the majority holdings, the courts
were dealing with legal easements that had been created on
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the remaining land.6 The reason usually advanced to charge
the purchaser with notice of the easement is that an ease-
ment is considered to be an interest in the estate itself and,
that being the case, is entitled under the recording acts, to be
recorded.7 The case of Lowes v. Carter" held that where the
prior deed conveyed both certain lands and an easement in
the remaining lands, it was not necessary to execute a sepa-
rate instrument to create the easement because the
. . .method adopted was practical and appropri-
ate and was authorized by the law as a means of
safeguarding the rights created by the deed against
adverse interest of later origin."
A recent case dealing with easements is Waldrop v. Town
of Brevard.9 A part of a larger tract was sold and conveyed
in fee simple absolute to be used as a garbage disposal or
dump by the defendant. The grantor covenanted for him-
self, his heirs, and assigns that all rights of action, as to the
retained land, either legal or equitable arising out of the use
of the land conveyed, would be waived. The plaintiff, Wal-
drop, was a subsequent purchaser of part of the grantor's
retained lands. In an action against the prior grantee, the
question of notice of the grantor's covenant arose. The
6 Hamilton v. Smith, 212 Ark. 893, 208 S.W.2d 425 (1948); Miles v.
Hollingsworth, 44 Cal.App. 539, 187 Pac. 167 (1920); American Brass Co.
v. Serra, 104 Conn. 139, 132 Atl. 565 (1926); La Cost v. Mailloux, 401 Ill.
283, 81 NE.2d 920 (1948); Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 Atl. 216
(1915); McQuade v. Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302, 183 N.W. 771 (1921); King
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 226 Mo. 351, 126 S.W. 415 (1910); Wal-
drop v. Town of Brevard, 233 N.C. 26 (1950) (in which court constru-
ed the encumbrance to be a "right in the nature of an easement");
Cullison v. Hotel Seaside Inc., 126 Ore. 18, 268 Pac. 758 (1928) ; and Lati-
mer v. Hess, 183 S.W.2d 996 (Tex.Civ.App. 1944).
7 It Is interesting to note that in the cases of American Brass Co. v.
Serra, 104 Conn. 139, 32 Atl. 565 (1926); Cullison v. Hotel Seaside Inc.,
126 Ore. 18, 268 Pac. 758 (1928) and Latimer v. Hess, 183 S.W.2d 996 (Tex.
CIv.App. 1944), the easement was a right of way over the retained lands
of the grantor and could have been easily ascertained upon an inspec-
tion of the premises. In the case of La Cost v. Mailloux, 401 Ill. 283,
81 N.E.2d 920 (1948), not only could the easement have been ascertained
by an inspection of the premises but the subsequent purchaser had ac-
tual notice of the encumbrance.
8 124 Md. 678, 93 Atl. 216 (1915).
233 N.C. 26 (1950).
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plaintiff argued that the covenant made as to the other
lands of the grantor was not in his chain of title and re-
lied on the case of Turner v. Glenn,10 which held:
". . a subsequent purchaser is chargeable with
constructive notice of restrictive covenants in his
chain of title, but he is not required to investigate
collateral conveyances of any of his predecessors
in title."
The court, however, held that the common grantor had cre-
ated "a right in the nature of an easement" in his retained
lands and that "grantees take title to lands subject to duly
recorded easements which have been granted by their pre-
decessors in title." Here the court relied on the recording
statute'1 to charge the subsequent purchaser with notice
of the easement. It is interesting to note that the court
also said the plaintiff's position might have been well taken
if it had been a restrictive covenant instead of an ease-
ment. There appears to be sound objection to this label-
distinction of the North Carolina court, for if a recorded
deed is to give constructive notice to a purchaser, it should
make no difference whether the deed contains a legal ease-
ment or a restrictive covenant, the latter being generally
classified as an equitable easement.12
Many of the legal easements encountered in this problem
of record notice are affirmative easements permitting some
act to be done on the servient tenement which leaves "tracks"
whereby the existence of the easement can be ascertained up-
on inspection of the premises, while the land use restrictions
merely prohibit the owner of the servient tenement from
doing some act on his land. The latter encumbrances gen-
erally cannot be ascertained by an inspection of the prem-
ises and the record must be relied upon to impart notice.
Several of the legal easement cases may be explained on
the basis that an inspection of the premises would have
lo 220 N.C. 620, 18 S.E.2d 197 (1942).
n N.C.GEN.STAT. §47-27 (1950). The court however cited two cases
along with the statute, one of which dealt with runability of covenants.
CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTEREST RUNNING WITH THE LAND, P. 176 (2d
ed. 1944).
RECORD NOTICE OF ENCUMBRANCES
revealed the existence of some kind of easement,"3 and a
purchaser is usually charged with actual notice of whatever
a physical inspection of the premises would have disclosed.
The cases supporting the minority view do not seem to
deal with encumbrances which are legal easements, but
deal mainly with land use restrictions. As pointed out
above, the record must generally be relied upon to impart
notice of an encumbrance of this type since an inspection
of th premises usually will not reveal its existence. A lead-
ing case supporting the minority view, Glorieux v. Light-
hipe, ' 4 held that record notice of a covenant imposing build-
ing restrictions on retained land was not chargeable to the
subsequent purchaser thereof. The court said, however, that
this case was different from a conveyance of an easement or
any interest that lies in grant. To the same effect is the
case of Hancock v. Gumm.'5 Thus we find two of the prin-
cipal cases supporting the minority recognizing a distinction
between an easement and a restrictive covenant. Tiffany,
in discussing this distinction,1 states that at common law
when an easement was created, it being a legal interest
in land, a subsequent purchaser of the servient tenement
would take subject to the easement even though he had no
notice thereof, and that the adoption of a recording statute
could not be regarded as having changed this rule if the
easement created were on record though in connection with
the conveyance of other lands. One may well doubt the
accuracy of this statement unless it be assumed that such
conveyance of other lands is within the purchaser's chain
of title, which seems to be the position under the majority
rule. This statement of Tiffany discusses the easement as
a legal interest as distinguished from an equitable interest in
" American Brass Co. v. Serra, 104 Conn. 139, 132 Atl. 565 (1926) in-
volved an easement of right of way and was apparent because of wheel
tracks and a wooden bridge over a stream. Cullison v. Hotel Seaside
Inc., 126 Ore. 18, 268 Pac. 758 (1928) involved an easement of right of way
where a foot path and bridge crossed the servient tenement. Latimer
v. Hess, 183 S.W.2d 996 (Tex.Civ.App. 1944), involved a right of way
and there was an existing alley way.
1 88 N.J.L. 199, 96 Atl. 94 (1915).
r 151 Ga. 667, 107 S.E. 872 (1921).
11 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1266 (3rd ed. 1939).
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land. It would appear that the adoption of the recording
statute would make a difference. Prior to its adoption
a bona fide purchaser without notice would cut off an equit-
able interest in land but not a legal interest, while under
the statute both legal and equitable interests are cut off
by a conveyance to a bona fide purchaser without notice.17
Thus under the American recording statutes, the legal
easement is no longer sacred and merits no distinction
from an equitable restriction.
The cases concerned with notice of restrictive covenants
have dealt mainly with building restrictions. This of
course involves another aspect of importance, namely the
presence of a recorded plat. Where there is a recorded
plat, the majority reasons that the purchaser is
put on inquiry notice concerning any general scheme of
restrictions that may have been imposed on the land.18 It
then becomes his duty to search fully the deed to other
lands which are contained within the platted area. This
being the case, record notice would not seem to be .the
deciding factor since he is on inquiry notice. The minority
reasons that it would impose an unreasonable burden on
the title searcher, and that for the restriction to be valid it
must be in the deed granting the very lands restricted.
Where there is no plat involved which might put the title
searcher on inquiry, but only one or two adjoining lots, the
argument that it would be an unreasonable burden to com-
pel him to read the deeds in full loses much of its force.
Certainly it could not be said to be unreasonable to require
the searcher to read one or two deeds to lots adjoining the
lot being purchased.
There are two unique cases dealing with record notice
which seem worthy of special consideration. In the first,
Providence Forge Fishing & Hunting Club v. Gill,19 the
17 Ibid., § 828.
I It is interesting to note that Miles v. Hollingsworth, 44 Cal. App.
539, 187 Pac. 167 (1920) is the only case involving a building restriction
that the court talked about the apparentness of the general scheme
which could have been ascertained by an inspection of the premises.
The court then said that the general appearance ought to indicate some
kind of restriction.
- 117 Va. 557, 85 S.E. 464 (1915).
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prior deed was to a large tract of land. That deed excepted
a ten acre tr4ct and set forth a contract agreement where-
by the ten acres were to be sold to the plaintiff Gill. There-
after the same ten acres were sold to the defendant Pol-
lock. Gill brought an action to obtain specific perform-
ance of the contract stated in the prior deed and contended
that Pollock was chargeable with constructive notice of
the contract. The court, in holding that Pollock was not
chargeable with record notice, stated that for a deed to give
record notice it had to be in the chain of title to the land
itself. This reasoning has been advanced by some of the
other courts supporting the minority view. But looking
at the particular situation involved, the holding appears
harsh for Pollock was bound to read at least the descrip-
tions in the conveyances made by his grantor, and when
reading the description of the tract conveyed in the prior
deed, he would have found the entire tract conveyed with
an exception of the land he was about to purchase. This
should have imparted notice of some kind.
The second of these cases is Lent & Graff Co. v. Saten-
stein.20 In that case there was a prior recorded lease for
the first five floors of a building with the right to use the
outside wall space between the tenth and twelfth floors
for bill board advertisement. A subsequent lessee leased
the eleventh floor. The court classified the right to use
the wall space as an easement and used as authority Holt
v. Fleishman4 to charge the subsequent lessee with record
notice of the easement. The Holt case has been often
cited by jurisdictions following the majority view, but
after Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehn
Bros., 2 2 the law of New York seems to follow the minority.
In the latter case, which involved an equitable restriction,
a higher court having this question of record notice before
it decided that one must take notice only of deeds in the
direct chain of his predecessors in title and that to require
a search of each chain from the common grantor would
seem to negative the recording act.
2 210 App.Div. 251, 205 N.Y. Supp. 403 (1924).
75 App.Div. 593, 78 N.Y.Supp. 647 (1902).
267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935).
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From what has been said concerning the reasons behind
the two lines of authority, there is little wonder the courts
have split so widely in their holdings. Though the courts
have made distinctions between land use restrictions and
legal easements, there is no reason such distinction should
be adhered to under our recording system. It has been stat-
ed that "restrictions under our American recording system
become encumbrances indistinguishable from recognized
easements." 23  The recording acts, as a whole, are them-
selves broad enough in their language to cover not only legal
interests in land but also equitable interests or any other
interests affecting or concerning the estate or title.
Courts should not close their eyes to the realities involved
in this problem of record notice, and find record notice or
no such notice by the device of technical classification of the
interest involved when the recording factors are identical.
The practical result of the holdings of the court should be
more important than the labeling of the encumbrances. The
problem facing the court often involves the burden of title
search as compared to the preservation of land values. Thus,
the loss of value to a highly restricted development may far
outweigh the burden of searching all of the grantors' con-
veyances. Then there is the problem of the desirability of
freedom of land use as against the preservation of the re-
strictions. Here there is no question of the grantor's intent
for it is clear from the prior deed that his intention was to
restrict the retained lands. All of these problems seem to
present an issue of the relative social value of enforcing
the encumbrances or removing them.
When this particular problem of record notice arises,
there are two innocent parties one of whom is bound to suf-
fer a loss. Professor Philbrick is of the opinion24 that the
subsequent purchaser is the more desirable one to protect,
and he would prefer to have the loss cast upon the prior
purchaser. This is not a just solution in light of the fact
that the prior purchaser is wothout means of protection
= CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND, P. 176
(2d ed. 1944).
PhilbrIck, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Nofice, 93
U. or PA. L. REV. 125 (1944).
RECORD NOTICE OF ENCUMBRANCES 133
other than placing his deed on record. Once this has been
done to safeguard the rights under the prior deed, the sub-
sequent purchaser, by thoroughly searching the record, can
ascertain the true status of the title to the remaining lands
of the grantor. Thus, we have one of two innocent parties
with a means of protecting himself. It would appear unjust
to place the loss on a party with existing rights and no fur-
ther means of protecting those rights, while the party who
has as yet suffered no loss has it within his means to prevent
any loss whatsoever. There is also nothing involved where-
by the doctrine of estoppel may be invoked to cast the loss on
the prior purchaser who has recorded. For the reasons
stated, the grantee under the prior conveyance should be
protected by charging the subsequent purchaser with record
notice of any encumbrance contained in the prior deed to
other lands made by a common grantor. The concept, chain
of title, should be made sufficiently elastic if need be to
achieve this result.
